916
THE NEW ZEALAND GAZETTE.
views in preference to those of any of the Colonial Parliaments. Differences of a serious kind must
ultimately result between Great Britain and some of her colonies, if any opening is left by which a
party in London can exercise an influence of this nature.

20. It must be remembered that the Colonial Department only communicates to the colonies such
    intelligence as it suits its own views to impart. At the present time, the intentions and recommenda-
    tions of the Secretary of State are conveyed to the Governor in despatches of which even Ministers
    know nothing, or only so much as the Governor may please to communicate to them.

21. In many cases, laws which involve the most important interests of dependencies of the Crown,
    or regulations the enforcement of which will mould the destinies of rising nations, have been made and
    brought into operation without those most deeply concerned having been previously consulted. Tod
    often, the difficulties which invariably attend on early settlement, struggles against native races, or the
    too ardent pursuit of wealth in a new country, blind the inhabitants of a colony to the probable effect
    of measures which have been taken and brought into force so rapidly and unexpectedly that they
    almost escape public notice.

22. Few colonists have been educated in a knowledge of constitutional law: they are, therefore,
    ill qualified, until trained by experience, to estimate the real value of a Constitution, or to weigh and
    foresee the effect which modifications in their Constitution may produce upon the future of their
    country. Under such circumstances, they are not very watchful of trifling political or social changes
    which may from time to time be introduced under the authority of the Colonial Department: yet the
    accumulated effect of these changes may gradually produce an entire alteration in their form of
    government, and, after the lapse of a few years, they may find themselves landed in political or social
    institutions to which they never would have submitted had they known it had been intended to impose
    them upon their country.

23. It was the objection entertained by many leading British statesmen to such dangerous powers
    being left in the hands of the Colonial Office, that induced the British Parliament to attempt to secure to
    the people of New Zealand, and other dependencies of the Crown, the power of controlling their own
    affairs, and of shaping their own future, without the interference of the Colonial Department.

24. The people of New Zealand, mindful of this, will, therefore, probably struggle against all
    efforts that may be unlawfully or improperly made to meddle with their Constitution, and to give to
    the Secretary of State, or the Governor, or the two combined, powers which the law does not confer
    upon them, and the exercise of which, if once allowed, might be drawn into a precedent most disastrous
    for the future of this country.

25. They would be wise in following this course, for to allow the interference of either the Prin-
    cipal Secretary of State, or the Permanent Under Secretary, with the Legislature or Executive
    Government of this colony, would be to permit them to humiliate our statesmen, and to, perhaps,
    subject them to severe temptation.

26. The Secretary of State is an officer whose authority is highly respected. His name and office
    carry great weight. It is an unpopular thing in any colony for a Ministry to differ with the Secretary
    of State; for it is generally believed that such a proceeding might turn one who could be a powerful
    and useful friend to the country into its foe.

27. The Secretary of State has also in his hands the power of conferring honors and distinctions
    which many colonial statesmen and colonists often desire, perhaps too eagerly, to obtain, and colonial
    statesmen might, in some instances, be unwilling to assume an attitude of hostility to a department
    possessing the power of bestowing such great advantages and honors upon Her Majesty's colonial
    subjects. To refer, therefore, constitutional questions for the decisions or opinions of the Secretary
    of State, and then to communicate those decisions and opinions to the Cabinet, is to enter upon a
    course which is likely sooner or later to create parties in the Ministry of the day.

28. Again, if the Secretary of State, or, in fact, the Permanent Under Secretary, is constituted
    the arbiter on such questions as those that have been at issue between the Governor and the General
    Assembly, and the Governor and his Ministers—that is, if an exterior authority is called in to interfere
    in our internal constitutional differences—a course would be pursued which would not only be humiliat-
    ing to ourselves, but would also be unfair to Great Britain, which has given to the people of New
    Zealand the power of settling all such questions on the spot by ordinary constitutional means: for the
    certain result of such a line of proceeding would inevitably be to create differences between Great
    Britain and this country.

29. Generally, it may be said that the people of New Zealand will always unhesitatingly leave to
    the Principal Secretary of State, or to the Permanent Under Secretary, the exercise of all those powers
    which the law vests in him, and will assist him in giving effect to them; whilst they will, at the same
    time, claim for themselves the right of exercising, without interference on the part of the Governor,
    the Secretary of State, or the Permanent Under Secretary, all those powers which the British Parlia-
    ment has bestowed upon them.

30. Sir George Grey feels that there is another point to which he should allude. The constitu-
    tional practice of Responsible Government requires that the Ministers should originate questions to which
    effect is to be given, and that, having originated them, they should then submit them to the Governor,
    with their advice as to the course which His Excellency should pursue in regard to them. In the case
    at present under consideration, the Governor has first moved in the matter. Without consulting his
    Ministers, or even informing them what he was doing, he submitted certain constitutional questions,
    which had arisen between himself and the General Assembly, and himself and his Ministers, for the
    decisions or opinions of the Secretary of State. He received these and communicated them to Ministers
    for their information, and, without consulting them on the subject, issued to them his commands, that
    his applications for these decisions and opinions, and the decisions and opinions themselves, should be
    laid before the General Assembly. By this proceeding on his part, the Ministers are made, not the
    advisers of the Governor, but his servants, to execute orders regarding which their advice has never
    been sought.