THE NEW ZEALAND GAZETTE. 915

might have been referred to the Secretary of State. However, in that case, each party would certainly
have claimed the right of putting their own view of the questions at issue simultaneously before the
Secretary of State.

7. In this instance, the Governor, without any communication with his Responsible Advisers, put
   his views of the questions he submitted to the Secretary of State before that great Officer of the Crown ;
   and Sir George Grey cannot admit the precision—in some cases he would almost use the term the
   justice—with which the points raised by the Governor have been placed before the arbiter selected by
   His Excellency.

8. Leaving, however, this point on one side, from a desire not to involve the great constitutional
   question which is really at issue in that perplexity which always arises from a controversy upon points
   not material to any question which may be under consideration, Sir George Grey would respectfully
   remark as follows:—

9. The Constitution Act has strictly defined the powers of the Crown, of the Secretary of State, and
   of the General Assembly, of which the Governor is a constituent part. The same Act entrusts to the
   people of New Zealand the power and great privilege of working out their own future destiny, within
   the limits fixed by the British Parliament.

10. Sir George Grey believes that the people of New Zealand are quite competent to perform
    this momentous duty, and are prepared to build up institutions under which their descendants may
    have assured to them liberty, equal laws, and equal rights and advantages. He further believes that
    the people of New Zealand are not only disinclined to permit the interference of any exterior authority
    in the great duty which Parliament has thus assigned to them, but that they would resent any such
    interference, and would hold their Ministers responsible for not resisting any effort which might be
    made to interfere with the rights and privileges which the law in this respect secures to them.

11. Especially would they be likely to resent the attempt of any one of the persons or bodies
    named in the Constitution Act to assume to themselves powers denied to them by that Act.

12. If Sir George Grey is justified in thus thinking, there are additional strong reasons for
    checking any attempt made by the Secretary of State to interfere with the proceedings of the General
    Assembly, or to express to that body, without solicitation on its part, any decision or opinion upon its
    proceedings, rights, or privileges.

13. It has long been universally admitted that in the Colonial Department the real power vests
    in the Permanent Under Secretary. The Principal Secretary of State of that department, usually
    suddenly called to office, and rarely holding it for any lengthened period, can know but little of the
    multitudinous colonies of the British Empire. His time is occupied by his duties in Parliament, his
    duties in the Cabinet, his private affairs, the claims of society on a great Minister of the Crown ; and
    when all these duties are attended to, but little interval is left for him to study the history and require-
    ments of so vast an assemblage of dependencies. Even to read the letters which from day to day pour
    into his department, would occupy the greater part of the time of the most industrious statesman,
    however conversant he might be with the conduct of public business.

14. From these and other causes, the Permanent Under Secretary, in whose hands lie the entangled
    threads of the various questions of importance which perhaps have been for many months pending in
    the Colonial Office, becomes the real managing power in that department. He is unseen and unknown
    to the public generally: upon him no real responsibility rests.

15. It may be said that in the main this line of reasoning applies to all departments of the State
    in Great Britain; but this, in truth, is no answer to the arguments which have just been used. The
    action of the Foreign Office, of the Treasury, of the Home Department, of the War Office, indeed of
    most of the great offices of State at Home, concerns the nearest and dearest interests of every inhabit-
    ant of the British Isles: hence the action of these departments is narrowly watched by the observant
    eyes of a jealous public, and is subjected to the careful scrutiny of the leading statesmen of the
    country. The attention of Parliament is thus ever closely riveted upon the proceedings of those
    great departments of the State.

16. On the contrary, in the case of the Colonial Department, the vast amount of business before
    the British Parliament renders it difficult to secure the attention of that body to any colonial question,
    whilst the members of it are too generally profoundly ignorant upon all colonial subjects. The public
    at large in Great Britain, also occupied by questions of near and intense interest relating to their own
    immediate welfare, give but little attention to colonial questions, which involve remote interests, and
    regarding which their information is necessarily extremely limited.

17. The power of the Permanent Under Secretary in the Colonial Department is, therefore, very
    great. He may largely change the relations of the colonies to the Empire without the leading states-
    men in England, or the nation at large, having the least knowledge of what is taking place : he may
    greatly modify the institutions of a colony, and shape its whole future, without alarm being taken in
    any quarter, even by those most interested in its welfare.

18. For instance, if his own views were strongly in favour of breaking the Empire up, in a few
    years measures could be taken which would render such an event ultimately highly probable. Did he
    desire to set up an aristocracy in the colonies, in some novel form, landed or titular, or both, he could
    get many firm steps made towards the achievement of such a project. The man who earnestly believes
    in either of these principles, armed with the vast, and generally long-continued, power possessed by the
    Permanent Under Secretary of the Colonial Department, could hardly avoid, perhaps almost uncon-
    sciously, adopting measures which would tend to the fulfilment of his cherished convictions.

19. Or, again, the Colonial Office is often liable to be pressed to adopt some line of policy by
    returned colonists, who, having realized fortunes, are resident in England. Some of these gentlemen
    are occasionally disappointed colonial statesmen, who, having failed in getting their fellow-colonists to
    adopt their views, hope still to see them carried out by pressure brought to bear upon the Colonial
    Department. It may safely be said that nothing could be more injurious to the interests of Great
    Britain, and to the colonies, than that a party should exist in England, and have sufficient weight there
    to induce the Secretary of State for the Colonies, or the Permanent Under Secretary, to adopt their