3366
NEW ZEALAND GAZETTE
No. 114

vi. dice (for use in games such as Tai-Sai),

vii. numbered balls (for use in games such as Keno).

c. It must not be possible to access the data bus, address bus, or control lines of any of the above mentioned circuit boards without gaining access to a restricted logic area.

d. A restricted area, being a form of cabinet, must comply with secure cabinet requirements as defined in section “C.2.1.9. Secure Cabinet Tamper Detectors”.

e. Until the Authority is completely satisfied with the implementation of section “C.2.1.11. Restricted (Logic) Compartment Tamper Detection Sensors” below, a logic area is to have provision to be sealed closed (that is, the interior of the logic area must not be accessible unless a seal is broken) using one or more of the Authority’s physical seals. A 4 mm diameter hole is required for each seal.

C.2.1.11. Restricted (Logic) Compartment Tamper Detection Sensors

a. The restricted area shall be fitted with a device or devices that will detect when the restricted area has been accessed, regardless whether mains power is switched on or off. Refer section “C.2.1.10. Restricted (Logic) Compartment” above. The use of Flip/Flops for this purpose is not recommended but will not be failed at this time.

b. Where the restricted area is capable of being removed from a secured cabinet in its entirety and replaced with another complete unit, the restricted area shall be fitted with a device or devices that will detect removal regardless whether mains power is switched on or off.

c. If the restricted area is accessed more than once while powered-off, it is only necessary to treat this as a single access.

d. The restricted area entry/removal detection circuitry must provide a method to enable software to interpret and notify of a restricted area access.

e. Once a restricted area is penetrated, the tamper system itself may be tampered with. Consequently, the manufacturer is presented with two options:

i. for all submissions after 1 January 1996, the tamper system itself must not be able to be tampered with or replaced without leaving evidence that this has occurred, or

ii. the tamper system must be sufficiently complex in its nature of operation that only a person who possessed intimate knowledge of the design and method of operation (eg. testing laboratory or manufacturer) would be able to bypass the tamper system.

f. Where distributed processing is used manufacturers should house all restricted boards within a single, restricted (logic) compartment. If this is not achievable, for all submissions after 1 January 1996 all separate restricted areas must, where practical, comply with all requirements of section “C.2.1.10. Restricted (Logic) Compartment”. If not practical, the Authority must be convinced that the level of security is adequate.

g. It may be acceptable for an item listed in this document (Refer “C.2.1.10. Restricted (Logic) Compartment”) to not employ electronic seals, but reside in a restricted area which is able to be secured by way of the Authority’s seals. Suppliers MUST NOT assume dispensation in this regard, but must have the risk associated with the components to be protected assessed by the Authority and a decision made on a case-by-case basis.

h. It must not be possible to reset the restricted area door open state either by hardware or software means, if the restricted area door is still open.

C.2.1.12. "Critical Memory" Requirements

a. The Authority will consider any storage device for critical memory.