Military Operations Report




20

THE NEW ZEALAND GAZETTE.

garrison consists of only 150 men, who are all
employed in adding to the defences.

The 28th passed without any tidings from the rear,
the pack-horses bringing up a report that the
Ngatiporou would not march. I assembled the
senior officers, and having ascertained their views
decided that as the supply was difficult and expensive,
and as we could not abandon the enterprise because
we could no longer calculate on a complete success,
we should send to the rear to ascertain for certain
whether the Ngatiporou were coming, and if they
were not, to attack the place in front only. The
natural consequence of doing so would be at best
but an imperfect success; but the spirits of the men
were flagging, and a movement was absolutely neces-
sary. I employed most of the men in practising the
single and flying sap.

Early on the 29th, I heard that the Ngatiporou
were really advancing, and were actually at Fort
Roberts. I therefore completed a small redoubt for
my stores, and rode down to meet the Ngatiporou,
whom I met at the Whare Kopai Stream. My
reception was most cordial. The tribe flocked round
me, and appeared in the highest spirits. Rapata,
however, was so ill as to be compelled to halt. He
said he had feared I was impatient, and that Mr.
Richmond had given him permission to return; but he
knew if he did so the tribe would be of little use, so
that he had decided to come on as fast as he was able,
however slow. He promised to come up next day.

Meanwhile, under great difficulties, the pack-
transport was being pressed forward by Mr. Rich-
mond and Captain Newland and Mr. Smith, whom I
had engaged for the service. The deficiency of
sumpter animals was a considerable obstacle, but,
working with a will, it was going on favourably. The
meat supply was also difficult, as animals could with
difficulty be kept at night. To avoid this, I con-
structed sheep-yards, and had small flocks of sheep
driven up for slaughter. Mutton is inferior to beef
for the field, but it possesses a great advantage in
being a more manageable sort of stock.

On the 30th, at 8 a.m., Rapata arrived, and soon
after the Ngatiporo, who were very well received by
the Arawas, of whom they speak in terms of admira-
tion. I sent out this day a party to scout, and
another road party to facilitate the transport, and
sent the pack-train to Fort Fraser to obtain further
supplies and more ammunition.

If Te Koti does remain till morning, there is a
very fair prospect of entirely cutting him off, and, I
trust, some certainty that his stronghold will be
taken, though the time occupied may be some days,
possibly ten or twelve. The account of the scouting
party is not as favourable as I could wish with regard
to the road of the party sent round to intercept the
enemy's rear; but distant views of country do not
convey accurate ideas of localities always, and the
guides seem certain they are right, so I shall make
no change of plan.

I have, &c.,

G. S. WHITMORE, Colonel.

Head Quarters, Ngatapa,
5th January, 1869.

SIR, My last despatch, of the 30th ult., brought my
operations up to the establishment of the depôt for
my siege operations on the next ridge to this place.
I there built a redoubt, and named it Fort Richmond.
I could get pack-animals to this point, after
improving the track, easily enough, though the hills
were high; but there was no grass, and horses had to
go back to Fort Roberts directly they delivered their
loads Beyond this point the track was across too
rugged a region to admit of pack transport till I had
devoted labour to improve it, and I was compelled to
trust to the men carrying their rations and ammu-
nition up and down the two hills on their backs.

On the 31st, I marched* at daylight to a conical
rise on the same ridge as Ngatapa Pa, but about 700
yards from it. The apex of this rise I fortified and
christened the Crow's Nest. Here I posted a few of
the best shots of the force as a picket to prevent
the Natives from firing away ammunition if the
enemy should open fire upon my position.

The Hauhaus were plainly visible, strengthening
their fortifications, when we arrived, and I turned the
morning to good account myself, strengthening my
camp and improving the road to my rear with Nos. 6-
and 7 A.C.

At length, about 1 p.m., the enemy opened fire,
discharging a volley suddenly, but all his bullets fell
short. Our sharpshooters replied by a dropping
but well-directed fire, which continued till night, the
enemy replying by volleys now and again.

In the evening, after receiving the reports of the
scouts and consulting with the Chief Rapata, I
decided that it would be better to change the route
by which I had intended to send the party to the
rear of the place. The right-flank gully was
evidently the better adapted for such a march, and I
ascertained that it was also the shortest. Our
scouts moreover informed us, that from the apparent
fortifications round to the rear entrance there were
no fortifications at all, and that on the enemy's left
the cliff was so steep as to render attack or escape
alike impossible. The cliff on his right flank was
not so steep or high. Not having enough men to
undertake both cliffs, I decided to neglect that on the
enemy's left, about 250 yards of which I left without
a guard throughout the siege.

After carefully considering the subject with
Rapata and Hotene, I gave orders to Major Fraser
to march at dawn with 200 men (100 of Hotene's
Maoris, and 100 Armed Constabulary), descending
by the bush into the bed of the creek, and keeping
in concealment, to work his way to the point A. on
the plan; on reaching this he was to send back for
orders.

Rapata with 60 No. 8 Division, A.C., and 60
Ngatiporous, was to take a parallel but shorter route,
and to gain the crest of the ridge about G., where he
too was to halt for orders.

Major Fraser, after some few hours, sent back for
ammunition and reinforcements, having carried out
his instructions and shot four of the enemy. I sent
his requirements on at once, and ordered him to get
as close as possible to the pa.

Rapata, without being discovered, gained his position
and entrenched himself, sending back to ask for
orders. I now moved on the Armed Constabulary
and more Ngatiporous, sending orders to Rapata to
extend to his left, and close in to the work.

By night the investment, as far as it can be so
called, was complete-Major Fraser, from my extreme
left, had communicated with me along my line.
Inspector Roberts, with No. 6 Division, was posted
on Hotene's right, under the cliff in the position
shown in the plan with a few Natives to assist
him in keeping watch; Wickliffe and Albert pro-
longed the line to Rapata, who in turn touched
the Artillery, which now came up with the mortar;
and the Division No. 7 A.C., with the Turanga

  • Force marched 31st:-
* Force marched 31st:-
No. 1 Armed Constabulary
No. 3
No. 6
No. 7
No. 8
(Arawas)
Armed Constabulary, Total
Ngatiporou
Head Quarters, Spies, Scouts,
Medical Department, &c.
Total

Officers. Men.
3 64
2 61
2 55
3 62
1 60
11 302
370
5 6
16 678


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Online Sources for this page:

VUW Te Waharoa PDF NZ Gazette 1869, No 2





✨ LLM interpretation of page content

🛡️ Despatch on Siege Operations at Ngatapa (continued from previous page)

🛡️ Defence & Military
5 January 1869
Military operations, Ngatapa, Siege, Fortifications, Transport, Rapata, Hotene, Armed Constabulary
  • Rapata (Chief), Allied Chief halting due to illness
  • Te Koti, Enemy leader whose stronghold is targeted
  • Hotene, Allied Maori leader providing troops

  • Mr. Richmond
  • Captain Newland
  • Mr. Smith
  • Major Fraser
  • Inspector Roberts
  • Wickliffe
  • Albert