Maori Affairs Policy Report




THE NEW ZEALAND GAZETTE. 235

own terms however extravagant or unreason-
able. On the other hand, Ministers have
entire faith in the natural results of an
actual defeat of the rebel armies enforced
with prudence, with firmness, with mercy,
and in such broad general principles as may
operate not on the mind of one individual
here and there, but on the feelings and sen-
timents of the entire nation, both that part
which has been engaged in active hostilities
and that which has not.

And it must be borne in mind that this
latter portion of the native community is to
be considered in what is done equally with
the actual rebel. It would be of little
benefit to patch up peace in Waikato if
rebellion were by that to be encouraged in
Cook's Straits or at Ahuriri. Waikato has
been and is the head of the rebellion, and
the neck of it must be broken there. If a
final, permanent, and complete subjugation
of Waikato is effected, this will, in all human
probability, be the last instance which will
occur of any combined resistance to British
authority and British law. If in our anxiety
to spare the erring Maori race, we press and
persuade them to come to terms before they
are really convinced of our superiority, and
before we have taken those material guaran-
tees for the future which it is contemplated
to take, we shall to a certainty have at some
future day to repeat the lesson which we are
now endeavouring to teach. If the present
struggle should be terminated without con-
vincing the natives all throughout New
Zealand of the folly of trying their strength
against the Europeans, and without a suffi-
cient material guarantee being taken, new
outbreaks will undoubtedly occur from time
to time which can only end in chronic
hostility of the race and in wars of extermi-
nation. The only hope of saving a remnant
of the Maori race is the termination of the
present struggle by their full acknowledgment
of their mistake, their full acceptance of its
consequences, and submission to the supre-
macy of law. It will not be done by treaties
of peace which might leave the impression
that they are an independent people, and at
liberty in any future imaginary casus belli to
take up the sword.

In concluding this part of their remarks,
Ministers would observe that no time has yet
been allowed for the results of the late cam-
paign to bear their natural fruits. It is only
three weeks since the final blow was struck
in Waikato by the capture of Orakau and
evacuation of Maungatautari. The mind of
the rebel cannot yet have fully realized to
itself the magnitude of the defeat and its
consequences; at all events it does not
appear to have done so. A little patience
on our side may, and there is little doubt
will, enable us to reap the fruit of the late
costly military operations, while, as already
hinted, undue pressure brought to bear on
the natives to induce them to come to terms,
or undue anxiety exhibited on our part to
escape the prolongation of the war, will
probably have exactly the reverse effect to
that which is intended.

One thing must be borne in mind. This
is not a war between two independent nations
living on separate territory, perhaps hundreds
of miles apart. When this rebellion is put
down, we have to govern the Maori, to rein-
state him in our community, to live with him,
to come under numerous mutual responsi-
bilities social and political. A war simply
between independent nations involves no such
consequences, and may be terminated on a
very different basis, while its termination may
be brought about by negotiations which
would be very unsuitable means by which to
terminate a struggle of the sort which exists
in this colony.

  1. As regards the question of the confis-
    cation of Maori lands, against which a protest
    is raised, Ministers beg to make the follow-
    ing observations:

In the first place, it is a custom which has
been always recognised by the Maoris them-
selves. In their wars, a conquered tribe not
only forfeited its lands, but the vanquished
survivors were reduced to a tributary position,
and large numbers to personal slavery. The
Government of New Zealand has always
recognised such a title as valid. The Wai-
katos themselves were paid by Governor
Hobson for such a proprietary right over
the district of Taranaki; and a very large
proportion, if not an absolute majority, of the
purchases of land from the Maoris in various
parts of the island, have been made on the
basis of a recognition of this right of conquest.
There is therefore nothing in the course
proposed abhorrent to the moral sense or
previous habits of thought of the Maori race.
(See Appendix C.)

In the second place, they never do consider
themselves conquered unless their lands are
taken. In previous wars between the British
Government and the Maori, which were not
followed by confiscation, friendly Maoris
have expressed their surprise at our modera-
tion. "What is the good," they have said," of taking the man? You should have taken
his land, then that work would have been
finished."

In the third place, when this struggle
began, the Maoris openly avowed their inten-
tion of taking the land and farms of the
Europeans when they should have driven us
into the sea. It was not uncommon, even
before the war commenced, for some of the
more insolent to come to a settler's house,
and after looking the place over to say, " Ah,
this house will suit me very well; that room
will do for my wife, that shall be my bed;
wait a little; by and by you will see." An
instance of this is within the personal know-
ledge of a Minister. The feeling was general
among the tribes which engaged in, or sym-
pathised with, the King movement, after it
assumed an aggressive character, hostile
towards the European occupants of this
country.

Fourthly, The chief object of the Govern-



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Online Sources for this page:

VUW Te Waharoa PDF NZ Gazette 1864, No 20





✨ LLM interpretation of page content

🪶 Report on Peace Overtures and Strategy following Waikato Campaign (continued from previous page)

🪶 Māori Affairs
4 May 1864
Waikato, Peace negotiations, Strategy, Land confiscation, Maori customs, British authority, Rebellion consequences