Camp before Heke's Pah,
July 2nd, 1845.

Sir,—Annexed is a detailed account of the action that took place between the troops under my command, and the Rebels, in the early part of the forenoon of yesterday—as also of the assault on the Pah, and our repulse which took place in the afternoon afterwards.

Finding the guns which I had brought with me from Auckland quite ineffective for breaching, from their very defective carriages, as they frequently upset from their own firing, I requested Captain Johnson, of H. M. S. Hazard, to send me one of his heavy guns, which was accordingly brought up to camp, a distance of fifteen miles land carriage, over most execrable roads, with great labor and difficulty, on the 30th; and during that day, a platform was erected on the side of a hill on the right of our position—the top of which hill was occupied by our ally, Waka Nene, and his tribe. A sergeant’s guard of the 58th Regt. was also there, to protect a six-pounder that had been placed there with a view of raking the enemy’s position. The Hazard’s gun opened its fire about 10 o’clock, A. M., and while the attention of every one was occupied in observing its effect, a sudden attack was made on the position from a very thick wood close in its rear, and Waka’s people were driven from it. I was in the battery half way down the hill when this attack was made, when I instantly ordered up a party of the 58th Regt., under Major Bridge, who gallantly charged up the hill so as to turn the enemy’s left flank, and regained the position with the loss of only one man.

This attack shewed me the necessity of coming to an immediate decision, and I accordingly determined on attacking the Pah, by assault, in the afternoon, as soon as the few shot brought up from the Hazard, (26 in number,) were expended; which I expected would so loosen the stockades as to enable the men attacking them to cut and pull them down. In pursuance of this resolution, a storming party was ordered to parade at 3 o’clock, p. m., for this purpose, and I issued instructions for its guidance, as detailed in the accompanying memorandum. The parties for the attack were enabled to advance to within from 60 to 100 yards of the point of attack, and there remain unperceived by the enemy, in a ravine under cover. When the advance was sounded, they rushed forward in the most gallant and daring manner, and every endeavor was made to pull the stockade down. They partially succeeded in opening the outward one, but the inward one resisted all their efforts, and being lined with men firing through loop-holes on a level with the ground, and from others half way up,—our men were falling so fast, that notwithstanding the most daring acts of bravery, and the greatest perseverance, they were obliged to retire. This could not be effected without additional loss in the endeavor to bring off the wounded men, in which they were generally successful. The retreat was covered by the party under Lieutenant-Colonel Hulme, of the 96th Regiment; and too much praise cannot be given to that Officer for the coolness and steadiness with which he conducted it under a very heavy fire.

I must here remark that the hatchets and axes, as well as the ropes for pulling down the stockade, and the ladders, were all thrown away or left behind by those appointed to carry them; and to this circumstance I attribute the main cause of the failure.

I trust that it will not be thought that the character of the British has been tarnished on this occasion. One third of the men actually engaged fell in the attack, and during the eight days that we have been engaged in carrying on operations against this place, one-fourth of the whole strength of British soldiers under my command, (originally not exceeding 490,) have been either killed or wounded.

From Lieutenant-Colonel Hulme I have received every assistance during the whole time of these operations, independent of his gallant conduct in covering the retreat. Major Macpherson, of the 99th Regt., who led the principal attack, and was severely wounded, also deserves every praise for the daring manner in which he led his men to the assault—and though slightly struck on the left breast at the commencement, he gallantly persevered till struck down by a serious wound. Equal praise is also due to Major Bridge, of the 58th Regt., for the coolness and steadiness with which he led his men to the attack, and his perseverance till called off. Where every individual has behaved equally well, it seems invidious to particularize names—but I cannot avoid mentioning the unwearied toil, zeal, and energy displayed by Lieutenant Wilmott, of the Royal Artillery, in conducting that department with the most inefficient means. Captain Marlow, Royal Engineers, and his department, gave me every assistance in their power, while labouring under the same inefficiency of means as the Artillery.

I must not either omit to mention the able assistance and the active zeal that has been displayed by Lieutenant and Adjutant Deering, of the 99th Regt., (acting as Major of Brigade), whether under fire of the enemy, or conducting the necessary details. The three Officers with Major Macpherson’s party, were all either killed or wounded—Captain Grant, Lieutenant Beatty, (who volunteered the former hope), and Ensign O’Reilly. The Volunteers from the New Zealand Militia, acting as Pioneers under Lieutenant Rigg, deserve to be mentioned—and that officer himself has undergone unceasing toil of the most harassing nature with zeal and energy. Lieutenant Wood, and the Militia Volunteers for the Artillery, deserve to be included in this commendation.

Captain Johnson, of H.M. Clipper Hazard, has given me the most unwearied assistance, in every possible way, from the commencement of our operations, by sending up supplies of all sorts, even from his own ship, when our public stores were deficient. The Seamen and Marines of H.M. Navy have always done the same.