92

For what really was the course pursued by the Colony? No sooner had it adopted a policy which could only be carried out and maintained by force, and long before the confiscated lands were fully occupied and settled, than it insists upon the Imperial Government withdrawing all its troops, by whom these lands had been conquered, without making any provision to supply their place, or rather in the full knowledge that the troops could not and would not be replaced by any adequate local force. The Colony challenges a large portion of the Native race, almost invites them to rebellion, and at the same time disarms itself,—strips itself of all means of defence—places itself at the mercy of a half civilized people keenly smarting under the loss of their lands. This may be called a policy, but it is the policy of the suicide. It would indeed have been strange had the Maoris resisted such a temptation or rather invitation, and not attempted to regain possession of the lands. But the course thus pursued appears still more unintelligible, when it is remembered that the Colony might have retained for an indefinite period three or four thousand troops, whose very presence would in all probability have prevented any fresh outbreak, at an infinitely less expense than the present Colonial Force costs.

Upon the result of this policy—upon the fearful sacrifice of life and property it has already entailed—it is unnecessary for me to dwell. It is sufficient to know that we have sustained a succession of defeats without a single decisive blow having been struck by our Colonial Forces—however gallantly they may in some instances have behaved—sufficient in any material degree to detract from the prestige of victory implanted on the rebel standards. We may glean what is the opinion of the state of affairs on the East Coast of those most competent to judge, from the simple fact that the Superintendent of Hawke’s Bay, the other day, deemed it necessary, to prevent a body of Native allies, under orders to proceed to the West Coast, leaving the Province.

Neither must we ignore the fact that there is a greater amount of discontent, distrust, and hostility amongst the natives than ever existed before—that day by day a larger portion of the race is becoming disaffected—that even those tribes which hitherto have been and still are loyal, and who on many occasions have nobly fought our battles, are becoming disheartened and discouraged by the reverses which have befallen our arms, and so doubtful about the ultimate issue of the struggle, that they are seriously asking themselves why they should be involved in it. Let such a feeling take possession of them, and I need not say it will be most unwise to depend upon them as permanent allies. Then if these massacres continue—and as long as such fiends as Te Kooti, Tito Kowaru, and others are at large there is no reason to believe that they will not—what becomes of the outlying districts, if they are all involved in the same ruin which has already overtaken some? What becomes of the towns? Where will this Colony of the North Island be?

I venture to make these remarks because it appears to me that it is impossible to exaggerate the magnitude of the present crisis, and that it is your duty as Representatives of the Province not to ignore it, but to take it into your serious consideration. You may not be able to control events, but any expression of opinion on such a subject from you must ever have great weight on the Councils of the Colony. My own opinion is, that if this Island is to be rescued from almost utter destruction, there must be an almost entire reversal of the past policy, and an immediate application for the Imperial troops on the terms offered by Imperial authorities. The retention by them of the 18th Regiment in the Colony is a sufficient proof that such an appeal would not be made in vain.

It seems almost a mockery even after thus briefly alluding to so grave a question—a question which to my mind is one of life or death to the inhabitants of this Island, to refer to those ordinary matters which I am bound to bring before you, and to afford you the fullest information thereon.

You will, I fear, be disappointed at the small amount of relief afforded by the conversion of your Loans. You will remember that the Loan of 1854 of £50,000, commonly known as the “Gladstone Loan,” bearing interest at 8 per cent., was terminable at twelve months’ notice, and that no sinking fund was provided. Notice was given by myself and the Acting Colonial Treasurer that it would be paid off at the Colonial Treasury on the 1st July, 1869. The Crown Agents announced in London, in May last, that they were prepared to convert this Loan into New