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was decided in my favour, in a manner which
could leave no shadow of doubt in my mind,
that a very large majority of the electors endorsed my policy, and approved of the course I
had hitherto pursued.

I will confess, that I had hoped, that after
the result of the election for the Superintendency,
the opposing majority would have followed my
example, and by resigning their seats, have
afforded the electors the opportunity of reconsidering the circumstances of their election.

As they however did not consider it expedient
to take this step, and as on the re-assembling of
the Council after my re-election, I could perceive no indication of any more harmonious
feeling existing—a course being pursued by
them which I could only regard as equivalent
to a refusal to vote the necessary supplies, I
prorogued the Council and requested His Ex-
cellency the Governor to exercise that power of
dissolution, which is placed in his hands by the
Constitution Act.

His Excellency declined to accede to my ap-
plication. The purport of his reply was, to
invite further conflict between the Council and
myself. It appeared to him, that the events of
the previous six months did not afford sufficient
proof, that we had arrived at an issue of that
irreconcilable character, which demanded the
interference of the “Deus ex machina,” provided by the Constitution. For my own part, I
could see no advantage to any one from a prolongation of the conflict: I could see nothing
but damage to the Province—damage to the
public character of all parties concerned—damage to the prospects of self government in
this Colony—and I therefore declined to act on
his Excellency’s recommendation, that I should
renew the contest and push it to further extremities—preferring rather to carry on the govern-
ment of the Province, by virtue of the powers
vested in me by the Constitution and Acts of
the local legislature, in conformity with a policy
which I was satisfied by my repeated elections
was in unison with the views and wishes of a
great majority of my constituents, and to expend
the revenue as nearly as possible in accordance
with existing and previous appropriations.

If his Excellency had granted the dissolution
I requested, he would at once have put an end
to this unfortunate “dead-lock;” for either I
should have found a majority of supporters in
the new Council, or failing to do so, I should
have resigned my office finally and unconditionally.

While I regret as deeply as any one, the
difficulties which have thus occurred, in the
way of carrying out the system of responsible
government, I must remind you, that these very
difficulties were clearly foreseen and foretold by
those who inaugurated it in 1853.

I myself have always held, and still hold, the
opinion, that the success of responsible govern-
ment in the Provinces, must necessarily be
exceedingly problematical, unless the power of
dissolving the Council at least once, be vested
in the Superintendent. The exercise of such a
power would generally, if not always, solve such
difficulties as have existed in the present case.
If, indeed, it is argued as it has been (in a
neighbouring Province), that such a proposal
does not meet the case of a Council desiring its
own dissolution, while the Superintendent refused
to dissolve, I would reply, that resignation is

always within the power of the members of that
body, who could by such a course test the con-
fidence of the electors; or if this is not con-
sidered a sufficient safeguard—a bare majority
of the Council can by the Constitution, call on
the Governor to remove the Superintendent;
and there still remains the further power of dis-
solution of the Council and Superintendent
vested in the Governor by the Constitution, of
which I would not propose to deprive him, and
which he would be at liberty to exercise on the
petition of a majority of the Council. But while
the existence of responsible government, without
a power of dissolution, (absolute or limited as to
the number of times for which it might be exercised), vested in the chief of the Executive, is
an anomaly, I must repeat, that such a power
would in most instances, prove an effectual
remedy for such political differences as would
be likely to arise between Superintendents and
Provincial Councils. And in saying this, I am
simply expressing the opinion of the members
of the first Provincial Council of this Province.
For if you will refer to the proceedings, you will
find that during the first Session, a Resolution
on this very subject, was moved by Mr. Edward
Gibbon Wakefield and seconded by Mr. Samuel
Revans—no mean authorities on questions of
Constitutional Government. The Resolution
was:—

“That in order to complete the system of Res-
ponsible Government in this Province, the Super-
intendent ought to be empowered to appeal to the
electors by means of dissolving the Provincial
Council.”

That Resolution was passed unanimously.

I will only add, that until the power of dis-
solution be vested in the Superintendent, Res-
ponsible and Parliamentary Government can
not be regarded as synonymous terms; for you
may have an Executive responsible in the
fullest sense to the people—enjoying in the
fullest manner the confidence of the electors, as
testified by their repeated re-elections—and
yet that Executive may not command a majority
in the legislature. Having exhausted all the
constitutional means in my power to restore
harmony between the Executive and the
Legislature, I am obliged to content myself
with thus indicating the remaining constitutional remedy.

Since this Council was prorogued, a large and
important section of this Province has been
severed, and erected into a separate Province—
an event of too much importance to be passed
over without comment.

The manner in which this separation has
been effected, is, I will venture to assert, unprecedented in the history of any Country. It
is a common event in the great confederacy of
North America, that the growth of population
has rendered expedient the creation of new
territories, and the introduction, into the confederacy, of new States. But in no instance, of
which I have ever heard, has the subdivision of
States or the erection of new ones within the
jurisdiction of existing States, been attempted
without the consent of the Legislatures of those
concerned; nor, indeed, could it be done without infringing the fundamental principles of
the Constitution. Much less has the power of
affecting these, or analogous objects, been en-
trusted to the sole discretion of the Executive
Government.