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thus deriving its origin equally with the State Legislatures from the people.

It differed in this respect from the previous Constitution, which was formed and ratified by the State Legislatures, precisely in the same way as the existing Local Councils differ from preceding ones, by deriving their existence, not from the Central Legislature of the Colony, but from Parliament, the source of the General Assembly.

If the great and sole object of giving a common origin to the Congress and State Legislatures, was to prevent either encroaching upon the functions of the other, is it not reasonable to conclude, that Parliament itself created the two Legislatures of New Zealand for a precisely similar purpose.

Although I have already referred to the general power of Legislation, I would still draw your attention to the terms in which it is conveyed. The words to "make laws for the peace, order, and good government of the Province," are the same words which are applied to the General Assembly—which were used in all previous Charters of New Zealand in conferring powers upon the Central Legislature, and which were employed in the Charter of Rhode Island, which is always referred to as the one granting the most comprehensive Legislative power. It cannot be presumed that the terms thus used in the several instances I have mentioned bear a different construction in the one case to that which they bear in the other, or that they were the result of accident. It is far more reasonable to conclude that they were the result of deliberation and design—and were employed by Parliament for the express purpose of declaring the real nature and character of the Local Legislatures, and of leaving no doubt as to the extent of their functions—for had it been intended to convey a less enlarged power of legislation to the Provincial Councils than to the General Assembly, surely the same words would not have been used. But Parliament not content with itself creating and itself conferring powers upon them, has still further protected the Provincial Councils against any attempt on the part of the Central Legislature to usurp their functions, by enacting in the 69th clause that any Bill passed by the General Assembly, altering the powers of the Provincial Councils, shall be reserved for the signification of Her Majesty’s pleasure thereon.

Parliament thus anticipated the probability of attempts being made to curtail the powers, and to bring within a narrow range the Legislative authority of the Provincial Councils, and wisely provided a safeguard.

There remains to be noticed the General Assembly’s concurrent and overriding jurisdiction, which constitutes the great defect in the Constitution, and is the sole obstacle to its harmonious working.

To contend as the centralists do, that the words in the 53rd clause—viz.—"The laws to be made by the General Assembly shall control and supersede any Laws or Ordinances in any wise repugnant thereto, which may have been made or ordained prior thereto, by any Provincial Council," confer upon the General Assembly the right to repeal specific Acts of the Provincial Councils, is, it appears to me, to enlarge the words beyond their true import, and by a forced and most unfair construction to authorise the General Assembly to alter the powers of the Provincial Councils—the very thing they are prohibited from doing by the 69th clause.

An Act of the General Assembly would no doubt invalidate whatever was repugnant to it in Local Acts but no power is given to the General Assembly in any part of the Constitution Act either expressly or by implication, to repeal any Act of the Provincial Councils.

In ascertaining the extent of this overriding authority and the particular cases to which it was intended to apply, the chief difficulty arises from the Act not having enumerated the powers of the General Assembly. Had the same principle been adopted which obtains in the American Constitution, then the evils of "uncertainty, conflict, and confusion" so forcibly described by Mr. Gladstone as flowing from concurrent jurisdic-

tions, could not well have occurred; for in that case the Central Legislature could have exercised no powers not conferred upon it expressly or by necessary implication. By referring, however, to the practice of the Government of the United States, which as Mr. Gladstone remarked, "is the great source of experimental instruction so far as colonial institutions are concerned," I think there will be little difficulty in ascertaining the legitimate construction of the terms conveying this over-riding authority. For it is remarkable, that most of the subjects reserved from the Provincial Councils are comprised in the limitations of the Powers of the State Legislatures, and that it is chiefly if not solely in reference to such matters, that Congress exercises a concurrent and over-riding jurisdiction. Thus Congress has a concurrent power of Legislation in matters relating to the militia, naturalization, bankruptcy, &c., but the most remarkable instance of its over-riding authority is that of taxation. In all cases except duties on imports, the States have the right to impose taxes, but if Congress lay a tax on any article, the right of the States, as to that article, is suspended; nay if Congress impose a tax on any articles already taxed by a State, the general tax must be first paid. Still though this power resides in Congress, it is never exercised except in a few matters of a Federal concern or in cases (as of taxation) of great emergency; and such I submit is the utmost extent to which it was intended by Parliament that it should be exercised by the General Assembly.

Whether therefore regard be had to the intentions of the authors of the Constitution—to the common origin of the two Legislatures—to the general power of Legislation conferred upon both, or to the terms in which it is conveyed—to the provisions protecting the powers of the Provincial Councils, or to the fair purport and construction of the terms conferring the overriding jurisdiction—the conclusion to my mind is irresistible—that Parliament intended to establish two separate and independent Governments—Independent each in its own sphere of action—one for local purposes over each Province—the other for general purposes over the whole colony—and that the Constitution Act can only be successfully carried out on the system of a Federal Union—the action of the Central Legislature being restricted to the few matters of Federal concern, and all of which are enumerated amongst the thirteen articles excepted from the Provincial Councils.

Of the Acts passed by the General Assembly I need only refer to one or two. From the Financial Despatches of the Colonial Secretary, recently published, you will have learned, that while the revenue of the whole colony—territorial and ordinary—is estimated at £200,000, the expenditure (including a sum of £20,000 for native purchases) is stated at £122,567, leaving an unappropriated balance of only £77,443 to be divided amongst the six Provinces.

If you deduct the New Zealand Company’s Debt, the cost of collection, management, and land purchases, you will find that the amount voted by the General Assembly for the expenses of the General Government, was £52,497.

Under Sir G. Grey’s arrangement, the Provinces received two-thirds of the net Customs receipts, and the whole of the Land Fund remaining, after deducting the Company’s proportion, cost of management, and native purchases. But in consequence of the increased expenditure sanctioned by the Assembly, the Provinces from the 1st of July will only be entitled to one-half of the net receipts of the Customs and Land Fund.

To show the loss of income thus caused to this Province, I may mention that I have been obliged to refund to the Collector of Customs the sum of £1950, being the difference between two-thirds and one-half of the net Customs receipts for the last four months and a half; and that I cannot estimate the total loss to this Province for the current year at less than £10,000. In other words, the Province will have to contribute under the new apportionment of the Revenue, towards the expenses of the General Government, during the cur-