known and recognised means of control which have
been tried and proved effectual in other departments
of the public service, rather than on some untried
experiment which, though giving promise of success,
may from some unforeseen flaw result in failure.

It is in this respect, as the Commission believe, that
the plan hitherto in operation has shown itself most
manifestly defective. The administration by heads
of denominations having not only withdrawn the
education of the province from the supervision of
the state generally, but having also had the effect of
practically abolishing that control over the expenditure
of public money in particular which forms so essential
a part of the functions of the Legislature.

Two methods were devised by means of which it
was intended that that control should be maintained.
In the first place it was provided as one of the conditions
of the grant that the arrangements connected
with school fees and salaries of masters should only
be made with the concurrence of the Executive;
secondly, that detailed accounts should be furnished
quarterly to the Superintendent, by the head of each
denomination, of the expenditure of the grant received
by each on behalf of his respective denomination.

From some cause or other practical difficulties
appear to have made compliance with these conditions
impossible, and they have consequently become
a dead letter. Whether the difficulties encountered
were in reality so insurmountable as they were assumed
to be is not a question requiring discussion here;
but the fact itself is worthy of note, because the mode
in which those difficulties were disposed of appears
to furnish a fair illustration of the ease with which
the most stringent rules may be set aside by a body
not directly accountable to the Legislature for its
proceedings.

In the present case the practical result has been
not only the creation of an authority independent of
the Legislature, but also of one incapable, in its very
organisation, of acting harmoniously within itself.
Instead of one body shaping its measures on one
regular and well understood plan, there have been
three bodies all independent of the Legislature, each
pursuing a line of its own and adopting a separate
plan of operations. In the organization of the schools,
in the choice of sites, in the conditions on which aid
is granted, in the remuneration of teachers, and in
many other matters of a similar nature no certain or
uniform principle has obtained.

It is of course not desirable that this evil should
be corrected by one of an opposite nature. A rigid
uniformity would be no less mischievous, but perhaps
more mischievous than the present entire absence
of system. The differences which exist in the circumstances
of the different schools seem sufficiently
great to negative any scheme which should apply
the same unbending rule to all. It is, however, by
no means inconsistent with this to endeavor to establish
some general unity of design to carry out some
general principle which, however its application may
be varied to suit the varying circumstances of particular
cases, shall be directed to the attainment of
the same end.

It was as the first step towards effecting the objects
here pointed out—first the subjection of the department
of education to the direct influence and control
of those who represent the mind of the community,
secondly the organization of the educational resources
of the province—that the Commission recommended
the formation of a Board directly responsible
to the Executive, and through the Executive to the
Legislature for all its proceedings—bound to justify
its past acts to the satisfaction of the Provincial
Council, and to obtain the consent of that body to
measures proposed for the future.

This general accountability to the representatives
of the whole community would, it is conceived, be
a much greater security against partiality or injustice
than any of those special contrivances which have
in some cases been adopted for attaining this end,
and which have mostly taken the form of rules for
determining the elements of which the Central Board
may be composed. That special qualifications for
an office exist in certain classes, and special disqualifications
in other classes is a maxim which has long
been found false as applied to individuals, and likely
to lead to inconvenient results. If the Executive is
restricted in its power of appointment and thereby
precluded from employing the services of those best
fitted for discharging the required duties, it follows,
as a matter of course, that the administration must
become weak and inefficient, while, if the choice is
free, it may be reasonably anticipated that any Government
accountable for its acts to the Legislature,
would select those most likely to give satisfaction,
to whatever class they might belong.

On these grounds it is considered better, upon the
whole, that the power of appointing the members of
the Board should be left with the Executive, in the
reasonable confidence of those being selected who
appear the fittest for carrying out the duties, irrespective
of class or denomination.

It is recommended that at first, and as the most
natural means of organizing the machinery, the functions
of the Board should be as general as possible,
so as to enable it to correct any abuse as it arises.
The change from the present system to one hitherto
untried, may be expected at first to create anomalies
and incongruities in detail impossible to be foreseen
or provided against by mere theoretical rules. As
soon as the new system, however, begins to work
harmoniously, this action from the centre should gradually
make itself less and less felt, till the whole
practical power passes into the hands of those locally
interested, when the Central Board would become
virtually the organ of the various localities, though
still retaining the right, subject of course, to an appeal
to the Legislature, of putting its veto on any act
(such, for instance, as the appointment of a manifestly
improper person to the charge of a school) which
might seem to call for this exercise of its powers.
It should, however, be understood that as soon as
the system is fairly at work, this power of the veto
should only be exercised in extreme cases.