bill to be laid before you for the purpose of
appropriating the Revenue thus placed at
your disposal, a question presented itself as
to the legal authority under which such appropriation could be made: and difficulties
have arisen on this matter, which I have
thought it right, by the advice of the acting
Executive Council, to lay fully before you.

The 66th clause of the Constitution Act
contains the special provision under which
it was the intention of Parliament that the
Revenue of New Zealand should be appropriated. Under that clause the whole of
the Revenue, after deducting certain charges
specified in other parts of the Act, is subject to be appropriated by the General Assembly; and the portion not so appropriated
is to be divided amongst the several
Provinces in the proportion in which the
whole Revenue has been contributed by
each. So far, then, as this provision applies
to the present question, it would appear
doubtful whether the appropriation of any
part of the Public Revenue, by the Provincial Councils, is a lawful proceeding, until
the General Assembly shall have previously
determined what share it will require for
purposes of General Government.

There are several objects to which the
General Assembly might legitimately wish
to appropriate public funds; for example, to
the establishment of steam navigation between the various settlements. But if, prior
to the meeting of the General Assembly, all
the Revenue of the colony shall have been
disposed of by the Executive of the General
Government, and by the Provincial Legislatures; either the General Assembly must
submit to forego the constitutional right
bestowed upon it by the British Parliament
of having the first claim to dispose of the
Public Revenue, or else the appropriation
made by the Provincial Councils must be
liable to be overthrown, and the arrangements made for carrying on the Provincial
Governments altered.

It appears indeed from the 54th clause of
the Constitution Act, that the General Assembly is prohibited from making any appropriation of public money, except upon
objects for which His Excellency shall have
been pleased to recommend that provision
shall be made; and it may be argued that,
as the General Assembly might be thus debarred from making any appropriation of
Revenue, except for the purposes determined by His Excellency in the instructions on
your table, the portion allotted to each Province may be lawfully disposed of by the
Provincial Council, without encroaching upon
the constitutional privileges of the General
Assembly.

But the power thus rested in the Executive to limit the appropriation of Revenue
by the Legislature, cannot be interpreted to

legalise the appropriation of that Revenue
without the consent of the Legislature.

The fifty-fourth clause of the Constitution Act is founded upon a recognised principle of the English Constitution; for the
House of Commons has imposed upon itself
a similar restraint. Since the year A. D.
1713, it has been a Standing Order of the
House, "that they will receive no petition
for any sum of money relating to the public
service, but what is recommended by the
Crown." But it has never been for a moment
imagined that this restraint could be
interpreted into a claim on the part of the
Crown to appropriate the public Revenue
without the consent of Parliament.

Nor must it be forgotten that although
the Governor may absolutely debar the
Houses of the General Assembly from voting money for other purposes than such as
he recommends, and from interfering with
the appropriation of sums reserved by the
Constitutional Law; yet his Excellency is
not free from the indirect control of the
Legislature even in these matters. He is
bound by the Constitution Act to lay full
accounts of the expenditure of these reserved funds before them, nor can he escape
from the indirect influence which flows
from the opinion of a popular assembly expressing itself by resolutions, by petitions,
by remonstrances.

If the appropriation of the Revenue by the
Executive Government were lawful without
the consent of the Legislature, the allotment of two-thirds of the Customs’ duties
to the Provinces, which has been arbitrarily
made to-day, might be as arbitrarily unmade to-morrow; and the same authority
which has withheld a portion of the public
Revenue from your disposal might withhold
the remainder, and the constitutional privileges granted to you by the imperial Parliament would be exercised by you as a matter
of sufferance, not of right. The Constitution Act would be a dead letter.

I do not imply that His Excellency has
claimed such a power. Whether it has
been exercised in the arrangements which
have been made for distributing the Revenue, I shall inquire presently. But the intention appears to have been only to make
such Revenues payable to the General
Government, as are now by law appropriated to certain purposes, and to leave the
remainder at the disposal of the Provincial Legislatures. But it must remain
a doubtful question whether the consent of
the General Assembly is not necessary to
make this arrangement valid, if only for the
purpose of placing its sanction upon the
reservations by the Government as being
according to law.

It will be therefore for the Provincial
Legislatures to determine whether they will
accept of the responsibility imposed on